We model problems of allocating disputed properties as generalized exchange economies in which agents have preferences and claims over multiple goods, and the social endowment of each good may not be sufficient to satisfy all individual claims. In this context, we investigate procedural and end-state principles of fairness, their implications and relations. To do so, we explore "procedural" allocation rules represented by a composition of a rights-assignment mechanism (to assign each profile of claims individual property rights over the endowment) and Walrasian, or other individually rational, exchange rule. Using variants of fairness based on no-envy as end-state principles, we provide axiomatic characterizations of the three focal egalitarian mechanisms, known in the literature on rationing problems as constrained equal awards, constrained equal losses, and proportional mechanisms. Our results are connected to focal contributions in political philosophy, and also provide rationale for market-based environ-mental policy instruments (such as cap-and-trade schemes and personal carbon trading) and moral foundation for the three proposals to allocate GHG emission rights known as the equal per capita sharing, the polluter pays principle and the equal burden sharing (the victims pay principle).
Introduction
Fairness and distributive justice is the primary concern in practical procedures for property rights disputes. Very often used in the final allocation of rights are proportional division, equal division and equal sacrifice. Examples can be found in numerous institutional setups including laws, social and religious norms, and agreed conventions, such as bankruptcy laws, divorce laws, court settlements for accident damage, international conventions on environmental problems, domestic or international resolutions on contested natural resources, 1 etc. It is important, especially in the case of agreed conventions, for the enforceability of the resolution whether the division rule adopted is perceived as being fair by the disputers. Indeed, this issue of fairness is at the heart of the recent failure to agree on a new international framework dealing with Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions after the Kyoto protocol. The above three division rules form the three prominent proposals for the allocation of GHG emission rights, domestic or international. 2 Countries in different stages of economic development have different perceptions of fairness and support different rules. Making the gap closer and reaching a final resolution is a political economy problem. However, the core issue is an ethical one and investigating it from the perspective of normative science will help facilitating the political resolution. 3 The normative foundation of allocation schemes, such as the above three division rules, has been a key subject in the literature of fair allocation. Nevertheless, most studies in this literature either focus on the issue of allocating a single good (money), dismissing the issue of fair initial allocation and its influence on the final allocation after the subsequent interactions among claimants (e.g., O'Neill, 1982;  1 See Ansink and Weikard (2009) for the case of contested water rights and Ansink (2011) for the case of sharing arctic resources. 2 The proposal to allocate on an "equal per capita basis" (see Carley et al., 1991 , Neumayer, 2000 , Saltzman, 2010 corresponds to equal division, the polluter pays principle (paraphrased as "you broke it, you fix it"; e.g., Singer 2002 Singer , 2006 to proportional division, and the principle of equal burden sharing (Posner and Weisbach, 2010) to equal sacrifice. Equal per capita allocation is also advocated by the so-called contraction and convergence proposal; see Meyer (2000) and Starkey (2008) . 3 There are quite a few authors who have pursued normative investigation on GHG emission reduction and the allocation of emission rights. Gardiner (2004) and Starkey (2008) provide an extensive outline. See also Margalioth (2012) and Posner and Weisbach (2010) . The ethics of intergenerational distribution is an important topic, which is not considered in our current investigation. See, for instance, Llavador, Roemer, Silvestre (2010) or Roemer (2011) for extensive treatments on this topic. into a single allocation), we do not rule out decentralized decision procedures, e.g., non-cooperative games. It is required, though, that the decentralized procedures have a unique prediction, or a unique "equilibrium" outcome as well as satisfying our basic solidarity axioms. Examples can be found in Volij (1997, 1999 ) among others. The second exchange procedure is based on decentralized individual decisions within the boundaries of the socioeconomic institution the agents belong to; Walrasian market exchange is the best known example, although many others exist. It is again described in a reduced form of social choice rules, for simplicity. The procedure can take a form of decentralized decision procedures such as non-cooperative games as long as the predicted equilibrium outcomes meet the basic individual rationality; uniqueness is not required in the second procedure. Examples of such procedures abound in the literature of market games and implementation theory. 8 The combination of the two procedures provides the advantage of simple information processing and decentralized decision making. This motivates our focus on procedural allocation rules.
Conflicts in property ownership are at the center of our resource allocation problems. The liberal theories of private ownership, most notably developed by John Locke (e.g., Locke, 1976) and Robert Nozick (e.g., Nozick, 1974) , are too restrictive (in the case of Locke) or too lenient (in the case of Nozick) to provide a useful guideline in our framework. In particular, Nozick's extension of Locke's theory gives a green signal to any resolution satisfying some minimal respect of the claims when they are representative of rights coming from the thesis of "self-ownership". It can admit even an extremely biased resolution of conflicting claims. 9 Our investigation may be viewed as an alternative way of extending Locke's theory in a highly stylistic framework of claims problems. We take advantage of the extensive literature on the claims-problems model that has served as a simple, yet rich, environment for studying allocative fairness during the last thirty years.
In a similar line of investigation, Roemer (1987 Roemer ( , 1988 Roemer ( , 1989 , Moulin (1987 Moulin ( , 1990 , and Silvestre (1989, 1993) propose generalizations of Locke's theory in the framework of common resources under a decreasing-returns-to-scale technology, which gives rise to the so-called tragedy of the commons. The allocation rules proposed in these works respect Locke's thesis based on self-ownership: 8 The most powerful notion of decentralizability in this literature is based on dominant strategy equilibrium and is known as strategy-proofness. Examples of strategy-proof exchange rules can be found in Barberà and Jackson (1995) among others. 9 See Otsuka (2003, pp. 23-24) for the same line of criticism against Nozick, with regard to the acquisition of the outside world.
that is, they coincide with the unlimited appropriation outcome in the case of a constant returns to scale technology, the case satisfying the Lockean proviso. Nevertheless unlike Nozick's radical generalization, they all have egalitarian features. It turns out that the so-called "Proportional" and "Nash dominator" mechanisms (e.g., Roemer, 1989) singled-out in this literature are similar to our proportional and equal award mechanisms, respectively.
Somewhat related, Gibbard (1976) and Grunebaum (1987) propose "equal rights" or "public (or joint) ownership" of unowned properties to be the baseline upon which the appropriation should be judged. 10 Moulin and Roemer (1989) , in a production economy model, investigate implications of the baseline of public ownership without denying the thesis of self-ownership. Their axiomatic approach shows that the axioms for public ownership and self-ownership, together with other standard axioms, imply a unique welfare-egalitarian outcome. This result, which has a similar flavor to our results, suggests that a fair assignment of property ownership, implicitly assumed through the requirement of their axioms, implies egalitarianism. 11 Interestingly, their model assumes a single representative utility function and, due to this feature, their axiom of self-ownership, which is essentially an order preservation property, coincides with no-envy. All their axioms are for end-state rules and they do not deal with the issue of procedural assignment of ownership rights.
In our model, claims can be viewed as representing the rights based on the thesis of self-ownership. In our procedural approach, assuming the basic condition of claims boundedness captures minimally the thesis of self-ownership. 12 The axiom of self-ownership, proposed by Moulin and Roemer (1989) , is similar to an order-preservation property of rights-assignment mechanisms, which we do not impose from the outset because it is implied by other basic axioms. Our resource monotonicity axiom (for rights-assignment mechanisms) may be compared to their axiom of public ownership, called "technology monotonicity". However, 10 Nozick sets the baseline to be the state where the unowned properties are unowned; their appropriation, according to Nozick, gives the appropriator the entitlement to the properties as long as no one is harmed relative to the baseline. Roemer (1996, Chapter 6) gives a comprehensive overview of the related literature. 11 Ownership rights in their paper are assumed to be respected when a mechanism satisfies certain axioms. 12 When claims represent self-ownership rights, it is natural to require that no person should get strictly more than her claims unless the claims of anyone else are fully compensated, that is, compensating each person's claims has the priority over any further compensation above claims. In the framework of our claims problems (with no excess endowment over the total claims), such a requirement is equivalent to claims-boundedness. 6 our axioms are merely procedural requirements in the rights-assignment procedure. They are not requirements for end-state rules as in Moulin and Roemer (1989) . Hence our axioms are far weaker than theirs; in fact, they are extremely mild allowing for a rich spectrum of mechanisms, which means, in our procedural approach, the baseline of public ownership and the thesis of self-ownership can be met jointly without putting too much restriction on the choice of possible mechanisms. To pin down a unique egalitarian mechanism in our main results, end-state fairness plays a critical role.
Although our procedural approach was taken for fairly practical reasons, as explained earlier, it is somewhat comparable to Nozick's entitlement theory of justice, which is proposed by Nozick (1973 Nozick ( , 1974 as an objection to theories of end-state justice. Interestingly, our main results elicit the complementarity between his procedural approach and the end-state approach. To wit, suppose that individual claims in our framework represent the degrees of rightful ownership resulting from the thesis of self-ownership. Under the case of property rights dispute in our model, what would Nozick's principle of just acquisition suggest? The minimal implication of the thesis of self-ownership, a basis of Nozick's theory, in our first procedure is that respecting claims should get the highest priority so that no one can get more properties than her claims unless everyone's claims are fully satisfied. In our first procedure, the total resources are in short of satisfying all claims and so this minimal condition is equivalent to the claims-boundedness assumption (everyone gets no more than her claims). Other than this minimal condition, Nozick's theory does not provide any further guideline for the resolution of disputed property rights. Our results pin down a unique assignment mechanism that embodies the principle of just acquisition, through the application of Nozick's principle of just transfer, namely an individually rational exchange rule in the second procedure, and our end-state fairness axioms. On the other hand, our results show that Nozick's procedural approach can be useful for the "realization" of end-state fairness. In particular, in the case of no-envy and sacrifice no-envy, the procedural rules we characterize lead to fair and efficient allocations when Walrasian exchange rule is used in the second procedure. In the case of relative no-envy, we show that there is no procedural rule satisfying both fairness and efficiency. Therefore, our investigation provides an instance where a principle of endstate fairness can facilitate the search of appropriate procedural principles of justice, in particular, principles of just acquisition, which constitute Nozick's procedural (or historical) theory of justice and, conversely, Nozick's theory can be used to implement a principle of end-state fairness through informationally simple and decentralized procedures. This is why we claim that Nozick's procedural approach, at least in our framework, is complementary with the end-state approach.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We set up the model in Section 2. We provide our main results (implications of fairness axioms and characterizations of rationing mechanisms) in Section 3. We conclude in Section 4. For a smooth passage, we defer some proofs and provide them in the appendix.
The model and definitions
Let N ≡ {1, 2, . . .} be the set of potential agents and N ≡ {N ⊂ N : 2 ≤ |N| = n < ∞} the family of finite non-empty subsets with at least two agents. There are privately appropriable and infinitely divisible goods. Each agent has a preference relation R i defined on R + , which satisfies the classical conditions of rationality (completeness and transitivity), continuity (lower and upper contour sets are closed), strong monotonicity, and convexity (upper contour sets are convex). 13 Let R denote the domain of such admissible preferences. 14 A collective resource, or (social) endowment, Ω ∈ R ++ is an -vector indicating the available amounts of each good. Each agent has a claim (vector) c i ∈ R + reflecting the entitlement from the endowment. We shall consider problems in which the endowment is not sufficient to fully cover the claims of the agents. Formally, an economy e ≡ (N, Ω, c, R) is composed by a set of agents N ∈ N , a social endowment Ω ∈ R ++ , a profile of individual claims c ≡ (c i ) i∈N ∈ R n ++ , such that Ω ∑ i∈N c i , and a profile of preference relations R ≡ (R i ) i∈N ∈ R N . 15 Note that if Ω = ∑ i∈N c i , then e would be a standard (pure) exchange economy in which c would correspond to the profile of individual endowments. Similarly, if = 1 and Ω < ∑ i∈N c i , then e would be a standard bankruptcy problem (e.g., O'Neill, 1982; Thomson, 2003 Thomson, , 2013 .
Let E denote the set of all economies, E (N) the set of economies with population N ∈ N , E (Ω) the set of economies with endowment Ω, and E (N, Ω) ≡ 13 As usual, we denote by P i the strict preference relation associated with R i and the corresponding indifference relation by I i .
14 As preferences are continuous, we can represent them by continuous real-valued functions, and it is sometimes convenient to do so. For each i ∈ N, let U i : R + → R be such a representation of agent i's preferences, and let U ≡ (U i ) i∈N . These representations will not have cardinal significance. 15 Our mathematical notation x y to relate vectors x, y ∈ R ++ means that x i ≤ y i for each i = 1,. .., with at least one strict inequality. Thus, we are implicitly saying that no commodity exhausts the corresponding aggregate claim. E (N) ∩ E (Ω). LetĒ ⊂ E be the set of exchange economies. We shall often denote the claims profile for an exchange economy (the endowments profile) by ω ≡ (ω i ) i∈N instead of c ≡ (c i ) i∈N , and will dismiss Ω in the description of the economy. 16 A feasible allocation for an economy e ∈ E (N, Ω) is a profile of individual consumption bundles z ≡ (z i ) i∈N ∈ R n + such that ∑ i∈N z i = Ω. Let Z(N, Ω) ≡ {z ∈ R n + : ∑ i∈N z i = Ω} be the set of all feasible allocations for economies in
. Given an economy e ≡ (N, Ω, c, R), a feasible allocation z ∈ Z(N, Ω) is (Pareto) efficient if there is no other feasible allocation z that makes a person better off without making anyone else worse off, that is, for some i ∈ N, z i P i z i and for each j ∈ N\{i}, z j R i z j . A social choice rule S : E → Z associates with each economy e ≡ (N, Ω, c, R) a non-empty set of feasible allocations, i.e., a non-empty subset of Z(N, Ω). Finally, for reasons that will become clear later in the text, we denote by [z] + the truncated consumption bundle after replacing the negative amounts of z ≡ (z i ) i∈N ∈ R n by zero, i.e.,
We shall be mostly interested in social choice rules that are characterized by the following two consecutive procedures: First, an assignment procedure mapping the non-preference information (N, Ω, c) of each economy e ≡ (N, Ω, c, R) into a profile of individual endowments ω ≡ (ω i ) i∈N , and second, an exchange procedure determining final allocations for the exchange economy (N, ω, R) obtained in the first procedure. In doing so, we shall be able to scrutinize the relationship between principles of procedural justice (imposed in each of these two procedures) and principles of end-state justice (imposed on the final allocations determined by social choice rules).
Claims adjudication
A problem of adjudicating claims, briefly a claims problem, is defined by a set of agents, a social endowment, and a profile of individual conflicting claims. Formally, it is a triple (N, Ω, c) such that Ω ∑ i∈N c i . Let C denote the set of all claims problems so defined. 17 We use the notation C (N), C (Ω), and C (N, Ω) in the same manner as used for E . An assignment mechanism ϕ : C → ∪ N∈N R n + associates with each claims problem (N, Ω, c) ∈ C , "individual property rights" 16 We denote z M ≡ (z i ) i∈N , for each N ∈ N , M ⊂ N, and z ∈ R n + . Furthermore, for ease of notation, if M = N \ {i}, for some i ∈ N, we let z −i ≡ z M . 17 Note that C ≡ {(N, Ω, c) : (N, Ω, c, R) ∈ E for some R ≡ (R i ) i∈N ∈ R N }.
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over the social endowment; that is, a feasible allocation ϕ (N, Ω, c) ∈ Z(N, Ω) with ϕ i (c) c i for each i ∈ N. This last inequality condition is called claimsboundedness, and it requires that individual property rights do not exceed the initial entitlements specified by individual claims. 18 We often refer to ϕ(N, Ω, c) as the individual endowment set by mechanism ϕ for the claims problem (N, Ω, c).
An assignment mechanism ϕ then converts each economy e ≡ (N, Ω, c, R) into an exchange economy e ≡ (N, ϕ(N, Ω, c), R).
We now define the three focal assignment mechanisms derived from the literature on claims problems.
The constrained equal awards mechanism ϕ CEA maps each problem (N, Ω, c) ∈ C into the allocation ϕ CEA (N, Ω, c) ∈ Z(N, Ω) such that, for each i ∈ N, and l ∈ {1, . . . , }, ϕ
where µ l > 0 is chosen so that ∑ i∈N min{c il , µ l } = Ω l . Clearly, if all claims are above the per capita endowment, i.e., for each i ∈ N and l = 1, . . . , c il ≥
The constrained equal losses mechanism ϕ CEL , which is somewhat polar to the previous one, maps each problem (N, Ω, c) ∈ C into the allocation ϕ CEL (N, Ω, c) ∈ Z(N, Ω) such that, for each i ∈ N, and l ∈ {1, . . . , },
where λ l > 0 is chosen so that ∑ i∈N max{0, c il − λ l } = Ω l . Clearly, if all claims are above the per capita loss, i.e., for each i ∈ N and l = 1, . . . , c il ≥
In particular, as we shall show later, in the two-agent case, where the problem can be depicted in an Edgeworth box, if both claims are below the endowment, then ϕ CEL selects the midpoint of the segment joining both claims vectors in the Edgeworth box.
The proportional mechanism ϕ PRO maps each problem (N, Ω, c) ∈ C into the allocation ϕ PRO (N, Ω, c) ∈ Z(N, Ω) such that, for each i ∈ N, and l ∈ {1, . . . , },
We now present a list of axioms for assignment mechanisms. The first axiom says that when there is more to be divided, other things being equal, nobody should lose. 19 Formally,
An implication of resource monotonicity is that when the social endowment of a certain good does not change, ceteris paribus, the allocation of that good should remain unaffected by resource increases in other goods. A widely applied principle, known as consistency, in the axiomatic literature (see, e.g., Thomson (2007 Thomson ( , 2012 ) and the literature cited therein) relates the allocation by a rule for a given problem to the solutions of the subproblems that a subgroup of agents face with the total amount they received at the original problem. It requires that the application of the rule to each subproblem produces precisely the allocation that the subgroup obtained in the original problem. That is, the original resolution should be reinforced with the reassessment by any subgroup. Here we consider two weaker principles, proposed by Thomson (2006) , pertaining to the exclusion of either agents with zero awards or agents with full awards.
The agents who receive zero in a given dimension of the original problem have nothing to contribute in the ensuing subproblem. Thus, they may not be of interest to other agents in the process of reassessment of the original resolution. The next axiom requires that reassessment after excluding such agents should not alter how much others get.
Zero-Award-Out-Consistency. 20 
Similarly, the agents whose claims were fully respected will not be interested in any further reassessment. The next axiom requires that dismissing a person fully awarded should not affect how much others get.
Full-Award-Out-Consistency. 21 For each (N, Ω, c) ∈ C (N), M ⊂ N, and l ∈ {1, . . . , }, if ϕ il (N, c, Ω) = c il , for each i ∈ M, then, for each j ∈ N\M,
Exchange
An exchange rule, F :Ē → Z, associates with each exchange economy e ≡ (N, Ω, ω, R) ∈Ē a non-empty set of feasible allocations, F(e) ⊆ Z(N, Ω). Exchange rules are studied extensively in the literature. The best known one is the Walrasian (exchange) rule, F W , which associates with each exchange economy e = (N, ω, R) the set of Walrasian equilibrium allocations. Formally, for each vector of market prices p ∈ R + , define the individual budget, delineated by the initial endowment
An allocation z is a Walrasian equilibrium allocation if there exists p ∈ R + such that for each i ∈ N and each z i ∈ B(ω i , p), z i ∈ B(ω i , p) and z i R i z i . We shall also consider other rules that are not Walrasian, yet satisfy the following basic condition for "voluntary" exchange:
Individual Rationality. For each (N, ω, R) ∈Ē , z ∈ F(N, ω, R), and i ∈ N,
The composition of an assignment mechanism ϕ and an exchange rule F gives rise to a social choice rule
We shall be mostly interested in social choice rules arising from the composition of an assignment mechanism and the Walrasian rule, or other individually rational exchange rules.
End-state fairness
We now move to some classical fairness axioms of social choice rules. One of the fundamental notions in the theory of fair allocation is envy-freeness, which although can be traced back to Foley (1967) , was not formally introduced till Kolm (1972) and Schmeidler (1974, 1978) . 22 It is widely accepted that such a notion represents an adequate test of fairness (e.g., Fleurbaey and Maniquet, 2011; Thomson, 2011 ). An allocation satisfies no-envy, or is said to be envy-free, if there is no pair of agents in which one prefers the allocation of the other. Formally, No-Envy. For each e ≡ (N, Ω, c, R) ∈ E and z ∈ S (e), there is no pair i, j ∈ N such that z j P i z i .
The above notion does not make use of any information on claims to establish envy comparisons. The following ones fill that gap. Given an allocation z ∈ Z and an agent i ∈ N, call c i − z i the sacrifice agent i makes at z. 23 An allocation satisfies sacrifice-no-envy, or is said to be sacrifice-envy-free, if no agent prefers making the sacrifice of anyone else to making his own sacrifice. Note that, as imposing the sacrifice of another agent might generate negative consumption at some dimensions, and preferences are only defined for non-negative consumptions, we consider truncated bundles to perform these comparisons in terms of sacrifices. Formally, Sacrifice-No-Envy. For each e ≡ (N, Ω, c, R) ∈ E and z ∈ S (e), there is no pair, i, j ∈ N, such that c i − c j − z j
This notion is similar to fair net trades (e.g., Schmeidler and Vind, 1972) for exchange economies. Given an allocation z, the net trade of agent i with endowment ω i is the vector z i − ω i . A net trade is said to be fair if, for any agent i, his net trade is at least as good for him as the net trade of any other agent. Now, instead of measuring sacrifices in absolute terms, we could also measure them in relative terms. Formally, given an allocation z ∈ Z and an agent i ∈ N, let c i /z i ≡ (c i1 /z i1 , . . . , c il /z il ) be the relative sacrifice agent i makes at z, whenever it is well-defined, including the case when c il > 0 and c il /z il = c il /0 ≡ ∞. 24 A dual 22 See also Varian (1974) . 23 Velez and Thomson (2012) have recently used the same word to describe a different, but somewhat related, notion in the "classical" problem of fair allocation (without claims). More precisely, they measure an agent's "sacrifice" at an allocation by the size of the set of feasible bundles that the agent prefers to her consumption. 24 The relative sacrifice is not well-defined in the case that, for some l, c il = 0 and z il = 0.
13 concept is relative compensation z i /c i ≡ (z i1 /c i1 , . . . , c i /z i ). Interpersonal comparison of relative-sacrifice or relative-compensation will provide the same notion of no-envy. Here we consider relative-compensation. When z il = 0 = c il , relative compensation is not well-defined. In this case, we will adopt the convention that when z il = 0 = c il , i is considered to be getting zero relative compensation with regard to good l. 25 We say that allocation z satisfies relative-no-envy, or is said to be relative-envy-free, at economy (N, Ω, c, R) ∈ E , if no agent prefers the relative compensation of anyone else to his own; that is, there do not exist i, j ∈ N such that c i × (z j /c j ) P i z i , where the product × is to be defined as the coordinate-wise multiplication. 26 Then this axiom can be stated as follows.
Relative-No-Envy. For each e ≡ (N, Ω, c, R) ∈ E , and z ∈ S (e), there is no pair, i, j ∈ N, such that c i × (z j /c j ) P i z i , where for all l, the l-th component of z j /c j equals zero when z jl = c jl = 0.
The results
As we show in this section, using the three notions of fairness in Section 2.3, we provide axiomatic characterizations of the three central assignment mechanisms, the constrained equal awards mechanism, the constrained equal losses mechanism and the proportional mechanism.
No-envy and the constrained equal awards mechanism
A trivial way of guaranteeing no-envy is to divide equally. For each (N, Ω, c) ∈ C , let ω ed (N, Ω, c) be the equal division allocation in which each agent i receives Ω/n. We sometimes denote ω ed (N, Ω, c) by ω ed (N, Ω). Note that ω ed (N, Ω, c) may not necessarily satisfy claims-boundedness. In particular, when claims are distributed very unequally (one agent with extremely large claims and another with small claims), claims-boundedness restricts the choice of initial endowments which are so unequal that any individual rational exchange from these endowments will make the poor agent (the one with small claims) envy the rich agent (the one with extremely large claims). Therefore, for these economies, no-envy is too strong a requirement to satisfy. Thus, we will require no-envy only for the economies with somewhat even distribution of claims across agents.
Let E 0 ≡ {(N, Ω, c, R) ∈ E : 0 ≤ ω ed (N, Ω) ≤ c} be the set of economies where equal division satisfies claims-boundedness. Let C 0 ≡ {(N, Ω, c) ∈ C : 0 ≤ ω ed (N, Ω) ≤ c} be the set of the corresponding claims problems. There are infinitely many envy-free and efficient allocations at typical economies in E 0 . Thus, there are infinitely many selections from such allocations, namely social choice rules satisfying efficiency and no-envy on E 0 . Nevertheless, when one focuses on the social choice rules that are represented by a combination of an assignment mechanism and an individually rational exchange rule, all but one social choice rules are ruled out, as we show in this section. In order to do that, we need first some preliminary results. Lemma 1. Let F be an exchange rule satisfying individual rationality. Let ϕ be an assignment mechanism that, when combined with F, generates a social choice rule satisfying no-envy. Then, for each
Proof. Let F be an individually rational exchange rule and ϕ be an assignment mechanism that, when combined with F, generates a social choice rule satisfying no-envy. Suppose, by contradiction, that there exists
R h is strictly convex for some h ∈ N, and ω is Pareto efficient at R. Then ω is the only feasible allocation that satisfies individual rationality. 27 Hence, ω = F(N, ω, R). As p · ω j > p · ω i , agent i prefers j's bundle to his own, contradicting no-envy. Proposition 1. The claims domain C 0 is the maximal domain on which an assignment mechanism and an individually rational exchange rule combined together can generate envy-free allocations. Moreover, on this maximal claims domain, individual rationality, no-envy, and efficiency are compatible.
Proof. Let (N, Ω, c) ∈ C \C 0 . Let ϕ be an assignment mechanism and F an individually rational exchange rule such that, when combined together, can generate envy-free allocations. Then, by Lemma 1, ϕ(N, Ω, c) = ω ed (N, Ω, c) but as (N, Ω, c) / ∈ C 0 , this would contradict the claims boundedness assumption of assignment mechanisms.
On the other hand, using the constrained equal awards mechanism and the Walrasian exchange rule, the second statement follows from the First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics, which states that all Walrasian equilibrium allocations are efficient.
Proposition 2. Let F be an exchange rule satisfying individual rationality. If an assignment mechanism ϕ satisfies resource monotonicity and, when combined with F, leads to a social choice rule satisfying no-envy on E 0 , then, ϕ(N, Ω, c) = ϕ CEA (N, Ω, c), for each (N, Ω, c) ∈ C , with |N| = 2.
Proof. Let F be an exchange rule satisfying individual rationality, and ϕ an assignment mechanism satisfying resource monotonicity such that, when combined with F, leads to a social choice rule satisfying no-envy on E 0 . Furthermore, let (N, Ω, c) ∈ C , with |N| = 2. Without loss of generality, assume that N ≡ {1, 2}.
We show that ϕ coincides with ϕ CEA on C (N, k) for each k = 0, 1, . . . , , using mathematical induction.
By Lemma 1, ϕ coincides with ϕ CEA on C (N, 0). Let l ∈ {1, . . . , }, Suppose, by induction, that ϕ coincides with ϕ CEA on C (N, k) for each k ≤ l − 1. We now prove that ϕ coincides with ϕ CEA on C (N, l) .
Let Ω be such that Ω l ≡ 2c 1l and for each k = l, Ω k ≡ Ω k . Then (N, c, Ω ) ∈ C (N, l − 1) and, by the induction hypothesis,
As Ω k = Ω k for each k = l, then applying resource monotonicity to both ϕ and ϕ CEA , Ω, c) . Hence, using (3.1), for each k = l, we conclude the proof.
When the assignment mechanism satisfies an additional consistency axiom, this result for two-person economies can be extended to general economies as stated next in the main result of this section. Theorem 1. An assignment mechanism satisfies resource monotonicity and fullaward-out-consistency and, when combined with an individually rational exchange rule, leads to a social choice rule satisfying no-envy on E 0 if and only if it is the constrained equal awards mechanism.
Proof. It is straightforward to see that the constrained equal awards mechanism satisfies resource monotonicity and full-award-out-consistency and, when combined with an individually rational exchange rule (e.g., the Walrasian rule), leads to a social choice rule satisfying no-envy on E 0 . We focus on the converse implication, which we prove for the case = 1. 29 Let ϕ be an assignment mechanism satisfying resource monotonicity and full-award-out-consistency that, when combined with an individually rational exchange rule, leads to a social choice rule satisfying no-envy on E 0 . By Lemma 1, we only have to show that, for each
The proof is by induction. More precisely, let (N, Ω, c) ∈ C \C 0 . For ease of exposition, and without loss of generality, we assume that N = {1, . . . , n} and that c 1 ≤ c 2 ≤ ··· ≤ c n . Now, for each m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} let 30
It is straightforward to see that (N, Ω , c) .
By resource monotonicity, ϕ 1 (N, Ω, c) ≥ c 1 . Thus, by claims-boundedness, ϕ 1 (N, Ω, c) = c 1 . Now, as (N\{1}, c −1 , Ω − c 1 ) ∈ C 0 , it follows, by Lemma 1, that
3) 29 The general proof uses an induction argument similar to the one in the proof of Proposition 2 and is provided in the appendix. 30 We also use the notational convention ∑ Remark 1. Full-award-out-consistency can be strengthened in the statement of the theorem to consistency. In this case, the "only if" part can be proven using Proposition 2 and the so-called Elevator Lemma (e.g., Thomson, 2007 ).
Sacrifice-no-envy and the constrained equal losses mechanism
A trivial way of guaranteeing sacrifice-no-envy is to allocate equally the total loss or sacrifice ∑ i∈N c i − Ω the society has to bear. For each (N, Ω, c) ∈ C , let es(N, Ω, c) ≡ (∑ i∈N c i −Ω)/n be the equal sacrifice at (N, Ω, c). Let ω es (N, Ω, c) ≡ (c i − es(N, Ω, c)) i∈N be the equal sacrifice allocation. Note that ω es (N, Ω, c) may contain some negative consumptions, in which case it is not a well-defined allocation. In particular, when agents have quite disparate claims (an agent with extremely large claims, even larger than Ω, and the others with extremely small claims), it may not be possible to satisfy sacrifice-no-envy at all. Thus, we first restrict our attention to less extreme cases where equal sacrifice is feasible. Formally, let C * ≡ {(N, Ω, c) ∈ C : ω es (N, Ω, c) ∈ Z(N, Ω)} and E * ≡ {e = (N, Ω, c, R) ∈ E : (N, Ω, c) ∈ C * }. It is not difficult to show that there are infinite social choice rules that satisfy efficiency and sacrifice-no-envy, when restricted to E * . This can be demonstrated by the infinite cardinality of the set of sacrifice-envy-free and efficient allocations at typical economies in E * . However, when one focuses on the type of social choice rules that are a combination of an assignment mechanism and an individually rational exchange rule, all but one social choice rules are ruled out, as we show in this section. In order to do that, we need first some preliminary results.
Lemma 2. Let F be an exchange rule satisfying individual rationality. Let ϕ be an assignment mechanism that, when combined with F, generates a social choice rule satisfying sacrifice-no-envy. Then, for each (N, Ω, c) ∈ C , ϕ(N, Ω, c) = ω es (N, Ω, c).
Proof. Let F be an individually rational exchange rule and ϕ be an assignment mechanism that, when combined with F, generates a social choice rule satisfying sacrifice-no-envy. Suppose, by contradiction, that there exists 31 Let e = (N, Ω, ω, R) be such that R i is represented by U i (x) ≡ p · x, R j is strictly convex, and ω is Pareto efficient at R. Then, ω is the only feasible allocation that satisfies individual rationality. Hence, ω = F(N, ω, R). As p · ω i < p · [c i + (ω j − c j )] + , agent i envies j's sacrifice, contradicting sacrifice-no-envy.
Proposition 3.
The claims domain C * is the maximal domain on which an assignment mechanism and an individually rational exchange rule combined together can generate sacrifice-envy-free allocations. Moreover, on this maximal claims domain, individual rationality, sacrifice-no-envy, and efficiency are compatible.
Proof. Let (N, Ω, c) ∈ C \C * . Let ϕ be an assignment mechanism and F an individually rational exchange rule, such that, when combined together, can generate sacrifice-envy-free allocations. Then, by Lemma 2, ϕ(N, Ω, c) = ω es (N, Ω, c) but as (N, Ω, c) / ∈ C * , this contradicts the non-negativity condition in the definition of assignment mechanisms. 31 More precisely,
On the other hand, using the constrained equal losses mechanism and the Walrasian exchange rule, the second statement follows from the First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics. Proposition 4. Let F be an exchange rule satisfying individual rationality. If an assignment mechanism ϕ satisfies resource monotonicity and, when combined with F, leads to a social choice rule satisfying sacrifice-no-envy on E * , then, ϕ(N, Ω, c) = ϕ CEL (N, Ω, c), for each (N, Ω, c) ∈ C , with |N| = 2.
Proof. Let F be an exchange rule satisfying individual rationality, and ϕ an assignment mechanism satisfying resource monotonicity such that, when combined with F, leads to a social choice rule satisfying sacrifice-no-envy on E * . Furthermore, let (N, Ω, c) ∈ C , with |N| = 2. Without loss of generality, assume that N ≡ {1, 2}.
For
We show that ϕ coincides with ϕ CEL on C (N, k) for each k = 0, 1, . . . , , using mathematical induction.
By Lemma 2, ϕ coincides with ϕ CEL on C * (N, 0). Let l ∈ {1, . . . , }, Suppose, by induction, that ϕ coincides with ϕ CEL on C * (N, k) for each k ≤ l − 1. We now prove that ϕ coincides with ϕ CEL on C * (N, l) .
and, by the induction hypothesis,
. By resource monotonicity and non-negativity, ϕ 1l (N, c, Ω) = 0 and so
As Ω k = Ω k for each k = l, then applying resource monotonicity to both ϕ and
Hence, using (3.6), for each k = l, we conclude the proof.
This result for two-agent economies can be extended to all economies with more than two agents, when a consistency axiom is added as stated next in the main result of this section.
Theorem 2. An assignment mechanism satisfies resource monotonicity and zeroaward-out-consistency, and, when combined with an individually rational exchange rule, leads to a social choice rule satisfying sacrifice-no-envy on E * if and only if it is the constrained equal losses mechanism.
Proof. It is straightforward to see that the constrained equal losses mechanism satisfies resource monotonicity and zero-award-out-consistency and, when combined with an individually rational exchange rule (e.g., the Walrasian rule), leads to a social choice rule satisfying no-envy on E * . We focus on the converse implication, which we prove for the case = 1. 32 Let ϕ be an assignment mechanism satisfying resource monotonicity and zero-award-out-consistency that, when combined with an individually rational exchange rule, leads to a social choice rule satisfying sacrifice-no-envy on E * . By Lemma 2, we only have to show that, for each (N, c, Ω) ∈ C \C * , ϕ(N, c, Ω) = ϕ CEL (N, c, Ω). The proof is by induction. More precisely, let (N, c, Ω) ∈ C \C * . For ease of exposition, and without loss of generality, we assume that N = {1, . . . , n} and that c 1 ≤ c 2 ≤ ··· ≤ c n . Now, for each m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n − 1}, let = ϕ N\{1} (N, Ω, c). 32 The general proof is provided in the appendix.
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As (N\{1}, Ω, c −1 ) ∈ C * , then, by Lemma 2, 
Therefore, ϕ(N, Ω, c) = ϕ CEL (N, Ω, c).
Remark 2. Zero-award-out-consistency can be strengthened in the statement of the theorem to consistency. In this case, the "only if" part can be proven using Proposition 4 and the so-called Elevator Lemma (e.g., Thomson, 2007 ).
Relative-no-envy and the proportional mechanism
We explore in this section the implications of relative-no-envy. In contrast with the previous two sections, one can find an assignment mechanism that, when combined with an individually rational exchange rule, leads to a social choice rule satisfying relative-no-envy on the "whole" domain. A simple example, among others, is the combination of proportional mechanism and the no-trade exchange rule. Thus, the maximal claims domain on which an assignment mechanism and an individually rational exchange rule combined together can generate relativeenvy-free allocations is the universal claims domain. This is in contrast with the counterpart results for no-envy (Proposition 1) and sacrifice-no-envy (Proposition 3).
The next result shows that if any other assignment mechanism, different from the proportional one is used, relative-envy is inevitable.
Lemma 3. Let F be an exchange rule satisfying individual rationality. Let ϕ be an assignment mechanism that, when combined with F, generates a social choice rule satisfying relative-no-envy. Then, for each (N, Ω, c) ∈ C , ϕ(N, Ω, c) = ϕ pro (N, Ω, c).
Let F be an individually rational exchange rule and ϕ be an assignment mechanism that, when combined with F, generates a social choice rule satisfying relative-no-envy. Suppose, by contradiction, that there exists (N, Ω, c) ∈ C such that ω ≡ ϕ(N, Ω, c) = ϕ pro (N, Ω, c). Thus, there exist i, j ∈ N, andl ∈ {1, . . . , }, such that ω il > Ωl · 
where R is such that R i is represented by U i (x) ≡ p · x, R h is strictly convex for some h ∈ N, and ω is Pareto efficient at R. Then, ω is the only feasible allocation that satisfies individual rationality. Hence, ω = F(N, ω, R). Now, as p · c j × ω i c i > p · ω j , agent j envies i's relative sacrifice, which proves the statement of the lemma.
As explained earlier, on the whole claims domain, individual rationality and relative-no-envy can be met when the proportional mechanism is used. This lemma shows that it is the only such mechanism. However, as stated in the next proposition, relative-no-envy and efficiency are incompatible, which is also in contrast with the corresponding results for no-envy (Proposition 1) and sacrificeno-envy (Proposition 3) presented above.
Proposition 5. On the universal claims domain, there exist an assignment mechanism and an individually rational exchange rule such that, when combined together, can generate relative-envy-free allocations. However, relative-no-envy and efficiency are incompatible. 33 Proof. The first statement follows from the discussion preceding the previous proposition. To show the second statement, consider an exchange economy with two agents and two goods. Let c 1 ≡ (200/3, 100/3) and c 2 ≡ (100/3, 200/3). Let Ω ≡ (100, 100). Preferences of agents 1 and 2 are represented, respectively, by u 1 (x 1 , x 2 ) ≡ αx 1 + x 2 and u 2 (x 1 , x 2 ) ≡ β x 1 + x 2 , with 1/2 < α < β < 2. Then, the set of efficient allocations is {((0, x 2 ), (100, 100 − x 2 )) : x 2 ∈ [0, 100]} ∪ { ((x 1 , 100), (100 − x 1 , 0) ) : x 1 ∈ [0, 100]}. We show that no efficient allocation in this economy satisfies relative-no-envy. First, consider the efficient allocations ((0, x 2 ), (100, 100 − x 2 )) with x 2 ∈ [0, 100]. for each x 2 ∈ [0, 100], all these efficient allocations fail relative-no-envy due to agent 1's envy. If agent 1 makes the relative sacrifice of agent 2, her consumption becomes (2 × 100, (100 − x 2 )/2). As α > 1/2, then (400α + 100)/3 > 100. This implies x 2 < 200α + 50 − x 2 /2, which means u 1 (0, x 2 ) < u 1 (2 × 100, (100 − x 2 )/2), i.e., agent 1 prefers making the relative sacrifice of agent 2 to making his own. In the case of efficient allocations ((x 1 , 100), (100 − x 1 , 0)) with x 1 ∈ [0, 100], using β < 2 and the same argument as above for agent 2, we can show that they fail relative-no-envy due to agent 2's envy. Now we are ready to state the third characterization result.
Theorem 3. An assignment mechanism, when combined with an individually rational exchange rule, leads to a social choice rule satisfying relative-no-envy if and only if it is the proportional mechanism.
Proof. It is straightforward to see that the proportional mechanism, when combined with the no-trade exchange rule (which is, trivially, individually rational) guarantees relative-no-envy. 34 As for the converse implication, let ϕ be an assignment mechanism such that, when combined with an individually rational exchange rule, leads to a social choice rule satisfying relative-no-envy. By Lemma 3, ϕ must be the proportional mechanism.
In contrast with the results from the previous sections involving other notions of no-envy, the Walrasian rule cannot be used here as equilibrium allocations may violate relative-no-envy. In the case of no-envy, the Walrasian budget set from the equal division provides equal opportunities of consumption for each agent, which guarantees no-envy at equilibrium allocations. Likewise, the Walrasian budget set provides equal opportunities of trades for each agent. Thus, when the initial endowment is chosen at the allocation with equal sacrifice, all equilibrium allocations necessarily satisfy sacrifice-no-envy. However, the Walrasian budget set does not provide equal opportunities of "relative trades", i.e., the ratio of the final consumption and the initial endowment across consumers.
The composition of the constrained equal awards mechanism with Walrasian exchange, an example of the rules we characterize in Theorem 1, is akin to the so-called Walrasian rule from equal division (or competitive equilibrium correspondence from equal division) that has been singled out as a focal social choice rule in the literature of fair allocation and distributive justice (e.g., Varian, 1974; Dworkin, 1981 ; Yaari and Bar-Hillel, 1984; Roemer, 1996; Fleurbaey and Maniquet, 2011). When the equal division is within the claims-bound of all agents, they coincide. In the model of classical exchange economies, the Walrasian equilibrium from equal division has been axiomatized in several ways. In particular, Yaari (1982) shows that it is the unique exchange rule that guarantees, not only noenvy among individual consumers, but also "coalitional" no-envy (no-envy among equal-sized coalitions), 37 provided the number of agents is sufficiently large. 38 The composition of the constrained equal losses assignment mechanism with Walrasian exchange, an example of the rules we characterize in Theorem 2, does not have a counterpart in the literature on fair allocation, as claims, which are collectively not feasible, are the standard for making interpersonal fairness comparisons and for determining the initial endowment from which Walrasian exchange takes place. Nevertheless, this rule and the end-state fairness concept (sacrificeno-envy) used for the characterization, resemble the Walrasian rule and the axiom of fair net trade, or trade-no-envy, introduced by Schmeidler and Vind (1972) in exchange economies. The Walrasian rule is shown to be the unique rule satisfying "coalitional" trade-no-envy if the number of agents is sufficiently large (Gabszewicz, 1975) .
Using no-envy as both procedural and end-state principles of fairness, Kolm (1972) , Feldman and Kirman (1974) , Goldman and Sussangkarn (1980) , and Thomson (1982) , among others, investigate whether procedural fairness induces the end-state fairness. The results are negative. The combination of envy-free initial allocation (equal division) and a sequence of envy-free trades may lead to a core allocation with envy. Our three main characterization results impose three versions of no-envy as the principle of end-state fairness and obtain noenvy, "with some constraints", of the initial allocation as an implication. We do ness points towards it. It remains as an open question to find appealing axioms, from a fairness viewpoint, that would allow to provide a full-fledged characterization of such mechanism in this context. 37 That is, any coalition does not find that it could use the resources allotted to the other equalsized coalition in such a way that would make all its members better off than they are with what has actually been allotted to them. 38 With a small number of agents, other mechanisms also exist.
not impose no-envy as a procedural requirement. Instead, other standard axioms (such as claims-boundedness, resource monotonicity, and consistency for rightsassignment, and individual rationality and efficiency for exchange) are used as procedural requirements. 39 In standard exchange economies, Thomson (1983) is also concerned with the three levels of justice, fair initial position (endowment), fair trade, and end-state fairness. In his approach, the principle of fair trade plays a central role and the principle of fair initial position is formulated through the possibility of changing the initial positions of agents (as in the definition of no-envy) and their objections based on the principle of fair trade from any reshuffled position. Thus, the key idea of no-envy is behind his notion of fair initial position. He shows that no-envy is the unique end-state fairness concept that is obtained from this procedural approach using individual rationality as the principle of fair trade (Proposition 1). His main result is to show that Walrasian trade and the principle of fair initial position defined via Walrasian trade give rise to the same outcomes as the Walrasian rule from equal division (Proposition 2). In a sense, this result says that if one accepts Walrasian trade to be a fair rule of trade and the possibility of changing initial positions among agents, then the only fair initial position is equal division. Our Theorem 1 reinforces this conclusion in the extended framework and using a different procedural approach. While Thomson's procedural approach is hypothetically oriented (reminiscent of the veil of ignorance or the original position) à la Harsanyi and Rawls, our procedural approach is practically oriented. We deal with an environment where we face the issue of conflicting claims as well as allocating resources. Our procedural approach is practical in the sense that it is informationally simple and decentralizable and is also representative of actual institutions. The first procedure of rights assignment allows us to utilize the findings in the vast literature of claims problems (bankruptcy or taxation problems, surplus sharing, cost sharing, etc). The second procedure of exchange is assumed to meet the very basic condition for a decentralized system, individual rationality. Unlike Thomson (1983) , we use no-envy as the end-state fairness axiom and characterize egalitarian rights assignment mechanisms for the first procedure.
Our model is also related with a model introduced by Thomson (2007) . 40 The aim in that model is to formulate appropriate notions of consistency dealing with the exchange economy augmented by some social deficit to be shared among 39 Our model and the procedural approach follow the lesson on procedural fairness delineated by Thomson (2011, pp.419~422) . 40 See also Peleg (1996) and Korthues (2000) .
agents. Mathematically, the model of "deficit-sharing exchange economies" (on p.184, Thomson 2007 ) is identical to ours, if the deficit T in his model is considered as the difference between the sum of the claims and the aggregate endowment in our model. However, we do not impose consistency on the whole procedure of social choice, but impose consistency only on the first procedure of assignment mechanisms. Thus, due to the claims-boundedness condition for assignment mechanisms, defining consistency is not an issue in our context. In the definition of assignment mechanisms, we have imposed the condition of claims-boundedness. It is a standard condition in the literature of rationing and can capture, in the most convincingly minimal sense, the thesis of self-ownership when claims can represent self-ownership rights. 41 Nevertheless, one may wonder about the consequence of dropping the condition. A result similar to Theorem 1, but without resource monotonicity and full-award-out-consistency, prevails after replacing the constrained equal awards mechanism with the equal awards (equal division) mechanism. 42 In a sense, Theorem 1 is simplified after dropping claimsboundedness. However, the other theorems will hold in the same shape as we currently have them.
To conclude, it is worth mentioning that the validity of our three end-state fairness axioms should be judged context by context. In some applications, claims may be perceived as indicating "credits", and in other applications, as indicating discredits (or responsibility). In bankruptcy problems, claims are investment amounts; the greater they are, the more credits are attributed to the claimants. On the other hand, in allocating pollution permits, claims represent past emissions and greater claims mean greater discredits or more responsibility for the environmental damage.
No-envy fully ignores claims information in judging for fairness. On the other hand, both sacrifice-no-envy and relative-no-envy make agents' claims be the benchmark outcome for fairness judgments. They require that the final outcome should move away from this benchmark without breaking the particular "fair" balance across agents, as specified in the two axioms.
When claims are credits, claims deserve special attention in judging for fairness and so no-envy does not qualify as a valid criterion for fairness. In such scenario, our results pin down proportional and constrained equal losses mechanisms as the only fair assignment mechanisms.
When claims are discredits, using these claims as the benchmark in judging 41 See Footnote 12. 42 This will follow directly from Lemma 1.
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for fairness, as in sacrifice-no-envy and relative-no-envy, does not go well with our moral intuition. In particular, when claims represent discredits of past generations, upon which the advantage of the current generation is based, these two axioms dismiss "historical accountability", and our results show that they yield 'grandfathering' rules, namely, constrained equal losses and proportional rules. For example, in allocating GHG emission rights, it is abnormal to ask people in continuous poverty (and, therefore, with little responsibility for the current GHG problem) to set their benchmark for fairness to be at their past record of poor consumptions (with almost zero GHG emission) while setting the same benchmark at the luxurious life style (with high GHG emission) for very rich people. Thus, in this case, the two axioms can be invalidated right away and no-envy is a valid axiom for fairness. In such scenario, our results, then, point toward constrained equal awards as the unique fair assignment mechanism. This is our justification for the scheme of equal per capita allocation of GHG emission rights. We take as its moral foundation the axiom of no-envy that is a focal axiom of fairness in Economics and Political Philosophy. The axiom of no-envy does not directly involve the allocation of rights; it emphasizes the welfare consequences of this allocation upon individual agents. Appendix C gives a formal presentation of this case as an example of our model.
A Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. As mentioned above, it is straightforward to see that the constrained equal awards mechanism satisfies resource monotonicity and full-award-out-consistency and, when combined with an individually rational exchange rule, leads to a social choice rule satisfying no-envy on E 0 . We focus on the converse implication. Let ϕ be an assignment mechanism satisfying resource monotonicity and full-awardout-consistency that, when combined with an individually rational exchange rule, leads to a social choice rule satisfying no-envy on E 0 . For each l ∈ {1, . . . , − 1},
We show that ϕ coincides with ϕ CEA on C (k) for each k = 0, 1, . . . , , using mathematical induction.
By Lemma 1, ϕ coincides with ϕ CEA on C (0). Let l ∈ {1, . . . , − 2}. Suppose, by induction, that ϕ coincides with ϕ CEA on C (k) for each k ≤ l. In what follows, we prove that ϕ coincides with ϕ CEA on C (l), which completes the induction argument. Let (N, c, Ω) ∈ C (l). For ease of exposition, assume, without loss of generality, that N = {1, . . . , n} and that claims on the l-th commodity are increasingly ordered, i.e., c 1l ≤ ··· ≤ c nl . For each m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, let 43
Furthermore, let
Then, it is straightforward to see that C (N)(l) = n m=0 C (N)(l) m . Note that, as C (N)(l) 0 ⊂ C (N)(l − 1), ϕ coincides with ϕ CEA on C (N)(l) 0 . We now show, by induction, that it also happens for the remaining subsets in the partition, i.e., for each m ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ϕ(N, c,
By resource monotonicity, and claims boundedness, ϕ 1l (N, c, Ω) = c 1l . Now, consider the problem (N\{1}, c −1 ,Ω), (N, c, Ω ) . In particular, for each k ≤ m − 1, ϕ kl (N, c, Ω ) = c kl . As Ω l = Ω l , for each l = l, it follows, by resource monotonicity, that ϕ il (N, c, Ω) = ϕ il (N, c, Ω ) and ϕ CEA il (N, c, Ω) = ϕ CEA il (N, c, Ω ), for each i ∈ N. Therefore, for each l = l and i ∈ N, ϕ il (N, c, Ω) = ϕ CEA il (N, c, Ω). As, 43 We use the notational convention that ∑ (N, c, Ω) = ϕ il ({m, . . . , n}, (c m , . . . , c n ),Ω), for each i ∈ N\{1, . . . , m − 1} . As ({m, . . . , n}, (c m , . . . , c n ),Ω) ∈ C (l − 1), it follows that ϕ il (N, c, Ω) = ϕ CEA il (N, c, Ω), for each i ≤ m − 1, which completes the proof.
B Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. As mentioned above, it is straightforward to see that the constrained equal losses mechanism satisfies resource monotonicity and zero-award-out-consistency and, when combined with an individually rational exchange rule, leads to a social choice rule satisfying sacrifice-no-envy on E * . We focus on the converse implication. Let ϕ be an assignment mechanism satisfying resource monotonicity and zero-award-out-consistency that, when combined with an individually rational exchange rule, leads to a social choice rule satisfying sacrifice-no-envy on E * .
Let C * () ≡ C and C * (0) ≡ C * . For each l ∈ {1, . . . , − 1}, let C * (l) ≡ {(N, c, Ω) ∈ C : ∀k ≥ l + 1, ∀i ∈ N, (∑ j∈N c jk − Ω k )/|N| ≤ c ik }.
We show that ϕ coincides with ϕ CEL on C * (l) for each l = 0, 1, . . . , , using mathematical induction.
By Lemma 2, ϕ coincides with ϕ CEL on C * (0). Let l ∈ {1, . . . , − 2}. Suppose, by induction, that ϕ coincides with ϕ CEL on C * (k). for each k ≤ l. In what follows, we prove that ϕ coincides with ϕ CEL on C * (l), which completes the induction argument.Let (N, c, Ω) ∈ C * (l). For ease of exposition, assume, without loss of generality, that N = {1, . . . , n} and that claims on the l-th commodity are increasingly ordered, i.e., c 1l ≤ ··· ≤ c nl . For each m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n − 1} let for each j ∈ N , which completes the proof.
C Allocating rights for greenhouse gas emission: A simple general equilibrium model
Consider a simple general equilibrium model of allocating GHG (green house gas) emission rights. There are two goods, energy x and money m for buying all other goods. Assume that energy can be produced using money under a constant returns to scale technology with a fixed marginal cost of κ ≥ 0. Each consumer i is endowed with money M i used to consume energyx i . The total energy consumption should be reduced to E where E ≤ ∑ i∈Nxi . Consider a scheme of cap-and-trade with the total energy consumption capped at E. In order for each i ∈ N to consume x i units of energy, i needs to purchase the same units of permit at price r. An allocation (x i , m i ) i∈N is feasible if ∑ i x i ≤ E and ∑ i∈N m i + κ ∑ i∈N x i ≤ ∑ i∈N M i , where the first inequality means that the aggregate energy consumption (also quantity of permit demand) does not exceed the aggregate energy supply (also permit supply) and the second inequality means that the total money demand (by consumers and the energy producer who uses money to produce energy) does not exceed the total money supply. When i ∈ N has initial permit endowment e i , i's budget constraint can be written as (κ + r)x i + m i ≤ re i + M i . A cap-and-trade equilibrium is composed of permit price r * and allocation (x * i , m * i ) i∈N such that (x * i , m * i ) i∈N is feasible and, for each i ∈ N, (x * i , m * i ) maximizes i's preferences over the set of bundles satisfying i's budget constraint.
This model of cap-and-trade can be transformed into our model as follows. Let p ≡ κ + r. Then i's budget constraint with i's permit endowment e i is written as px i + m i ≤ pe i + M i − κe i . Let c i ≡ (x i , M i ) be i's claims profile. Let Ω ≡ (E, ∑ i∈N M i − κE) be the social endowment of the two goods, permit (or energy) and money (net of inputs used to produce E units of energy). Now, with this social endowment, associating individual endowments (property rights over permit and money) ω i ≡ (ω ie , ω im ) (∑ i∈N ω i = Ω), any Walrasian equilibrium under the initial endowments with price p * and allocation (x * i , m * i ) coincides with the cap-andtrade equilibrium under the permit allocation (ω ie ) i∈N , with permit price r * ≡ p * − κ.
